References

Civil Aviation Authority. 2002. http//tinyurl.com/62wrzaw (accessed 27 October 2011)

Civil Aviation Authority. 2006. http//tinyurl.com/6caq3zk (accessed 27 October 2011)

Department of Health. 2000. http//tinyurl.com/44x4st (accessed 27 October 2011)

Fletcher G, Flin R, McGeorge P Rating nontechnical skills: developing a behavioural marker system for anaesthesia. Cogn Tech Work. 2004; 6:165-71

Flin R, Martin L, Goeters K Development of the NOTECHS (Non-Technical Skills) system for assessing pilots’ CRM skills. Human Factors and Aerospace Safety. 2003; 3:95-117

Flin R, O'Connor P, Crichton MFarnham: Ashgate Publishing; 2008

Gawande A, Zinner MJ, Uddert DM Analysis of errors reported by surgeons at three teaching hospitals. Surgery. 2003; 133:(6)614-25

Gawande AUK: Metropolitan Books; 2009

On error management: lessons from aviation. BMJ. 2000; 320:(7237)781-85

Industrial Psychology Research Centre. 2011a. http//tinyurl.com/3lzcjyl (accessed 27 October 2011)

Industrial Psychology Research Centre. 2011b. http//tinyurl.com/68bjfx4 (accessed 27 October 2011)

Industrial Psychology Research Centre. 2011c. http//tinyurl.com/64l7uha (accessed 27 October 2011)

Industrial Psychology Research Centre. 2011d. http//tinyurl.com/68zz7mg (accessed 27 October 2011)

Kanki B, Helmreich R, Anca J, 2nd Ed.. UK: Academic Press; 2010

Reason JFarnham: Ashgate Publishing; 2008

St Pierre M, Hofinger G, Buerschaper CBerlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer Publishing; 2008

Sherlock S Rapid sequence airway not rapid sequence intubation. JPP. 2011; 3:(3)123-8

Summers A, Willis S Human factors within paramedic practice: the forgotten paradigm. Journal of Paramedic Practice. 2010; 2:(9)424-8

Wilson J A practical guide to risk management in surgery, developing and planning.London: Royal College of Surgeons symposium; 1999

Paramedic non-technical skills: aviation style behavioural rating systems

02 December 2011
Volume 3 · Issue 12

Abstract

The Department of Health (DH) estimated that in 2000, approximately 10% of patients were harmed in some way while being cared for by the NHS. This equates to 850 000 patients and approximately £2 million in extended bed stays (DH, 2000). These adverse events are found in all areas of health care. For example, it is estimated that errors in surgery can be attributed to poor communication between members of the surgical team in 43% of cases (Gawande et al, 2003). In addition, cognitive and diagnostic errors contributed to 27% of claims against a healthcare organization (Wilson, 1999). Such errors, once analyzed, often show no lack of technical knowledge or skills on the part of the clinicians, and instead may be attributed to a failure in the non-technical skills of the clinicians and clinical team involved. Non-technical skills are defined as the cognitive (thinking) and social (team working) skills that, when combined with technical knowledge and skills, allow a practitioner to deliver safe and effective patient care (Flin et al, 2008). They help to reduce the frequency of errors and reduce the chance of adverse events. There appears to be little published literature detailing errors made by paramedics or discussing their non-technical skills. Generally, errors made by paramedics in the UK are highlighted through complaints from either hospital clinicians, patients’ families, or patients themselves. These complaints could result in lengthy investigations and often place stress on the ‘offending’ paramedic. It could also be argued that few lessons are learnt by the investigating organization or the profession as a whole. Once the error has occurred, it is too late for the patient, and a pro-active error avoidance approach is required.

In healthcare, the general attitude towards error is the ‘person approach’ (St Pierre et al, 2008). The person approach attributes fault or blame with the healthcare provider if an error occurs. It is often believed that the error occurred due to a lack of knowledge, or that the clinician did not pay attention, or did not do their best. This viewpoint inevitably results in a culture of naming, blaming and shaming; the solution is often to try harder (St Pierre et al, 2008).

James Reason's famous Swiss cheese model (Reason, 2008) describe best how errors occur and emphasizes that both organizational and human factors have to be considered. Each layer of the cheese represents an organizational, personal or environmental defence, and each is imperfect as shown by the ‘holes’. For an accident to occur, latent conditions, active errors and local triggering events coincide (Figure 1).

Subscribe to get full access to the Journal of Paramedic Practice

Thank you for visiting the Journal of Paramedic Practice and reading our archive of expert clinical content. If you would like to read more from the only journal dedicated to those working in emergency care, you can start your subscription today for just £48.

What's included

  • CPD Focus

  • Develop your career

  • Stay informed